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1 Introduction 
Processing of uncertainty is crucial in industrial applications and consequently in decision making 
processes [1]. In practice, it is often convenient to distinguish uncertainty due to the inherent variability of 
the phenomena of interest from that due to lack of precise knowledge [2]. The former type is referred to as 
aleatory, irreducible, stochastic or random uncertainty and describes the inherent variation associated with 
the physical system or the environment, the latter is referred to as epistemic, subjective or reducible 
uncertainty, and relates to the lack of precise knowledge of quantities or processes of the system or the 
environment. Although probability theory is well suited to handle stochastic uncertainty due to variability, it 
has been argued that the probabilistic approach may have some limitations in the representation and 
treatment of epistemic uncertainty in situations of poor knowledge, since it tends to force assumptions which 
may not be justified by the available information [3]. For example, ignoring whether a value of a parameter 
is more or less probable than any other value within a given range does not justify assuming a uniform 
probability distribution, which is the less informative probability distribution according to both the Laplace 
principle of insufficient reason and the maximum entropy criterion [4]. 
In this work, we consider alternative approaches to probability theory for the representation of epistemic 
uncertainty, such as Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence (DSTE) and Possibility Theory (PT). These 
approaches have been considered due to their ability in handling the uncertainty associated to the imprecise 
knowledge on the values of parameters used by expert information systems and for which reliable data are 
lacking. In this respect, it is worthy noticing that some research effort has been devoted to capture the 
relationships between DSTE, PT and probability theory, and a vivid research debate is still ongoing about the 
capability of Probability Theory in representing the epistemic uncertainty  
For example, in [5], a new framework is proposed, which extends Bayesian Theory to perform 
probabilistic inference with uncertain evidence. The extension is based on an idealized view of inference in 
which observations are used to rule out possible valuations of the variables in a modeling space. On the 
contrary, in [6] probability is conceptualized at the ‘betting’ level where decisions are made, which is 
different from the ‘credal’ level, where we find the epistemic uncertainty we are dealing with in this work. A 
pignistic transformation is required to pass from the credal level to the betting level. In [6], the authors also 
provide a comparison between the Bayesian framework and the Transferable Belief Model, which highlights 
that they may lead to different results. 
The strength of DSTE and PT lies in their capability of representing the epistemic uncertainty in a way 
less committed than that offered by probability theory. PT has been embraced to tackle a number of 
interesting issues pertaining to different fields such as graph theory [7], database querying [8], diagnostics 
[9], data analysis [10] and classification [11], agricultural sciences [12], probabilistic risk assessment (e.g., 
[13], [14]), etc. to cite a few. Analogously, applications of DSTE can be found in diverse domains such as 
signal and image processing [15], business decision making [16], pattern recognition [17], clustering [18], 
etc. 
In spite of the liveliness of the research in the field, it seems fair to say that the non-probabilistic treatment 
of uncertainty within soft computing methods has not yet been exhaustively investigated. After all, given the 
relative immaturity and small size of research community working on non-probabilistic approaches, it is 
hardly fair to expect that these are elaborated from soft methods to the same extent of that of probability 
theory [19]. In this respect, two main considerations can be done on the basis of the authors’ best knowledge:  
 There is no work of the literature which performs an comprehensive comparison of the main 
techniques to represent and propagate the epistemic uncertainty together with the aleatory 
uncertainty, from a practical, engineering point of view. For example, an interesting comparison 
of PT, DSTE and probability theory is provided in [20], where a simple case study is introduced 
as a workbench to highlight the differences among those approaches. However, even in that case 
the comparison is not complete, as neither (type 1 or 2) fuzzy theory nor Bayesian probability 
theory are considered. In conclusion, the issue of comparing the different frameworks is still open 
and future research effort will be spent by the authors in this direction. On the other side, while 
doing this, it is important to bear in mind that, quoting Smets [6]: 
 
“Uncertainty is a polymorphous phenomenon. There is a different mathematical model for 
each of its varieties. No single model fits all cases. The real problems when quantifying 
uncertainty is to recognize its nature and to select the appropriate model. The Bayesian 
model is only one of them. The TBM also only one of them. Each has its own field of 
applicability. Neither is always better than the other” 
For example, in [21] a different technique has been proposed to cope with the maintenance 
assessment issue in the case in which a team of experts is available to provide the ill-defined 
parameters, whereas the method proposed in this work assumes that there is just one expert to give 
them.  
 PT has never been applied in the context of maintenance modeling, which is the core of this paper. 
 
Maintenance is a key factor for safety, production, asset management and competitiveness. Establishing an 
optimal maintenance policy requires the availability of logic, mathematical and computational models for: 
 i) the evaluation of performance indicators characterizing a generic maintenance policy. Possible 
performance indicators are the production profit, the system mean availability, the maintenance costs, etc. 
ii) the identification of the optimal maintenance intervention policy from the point of view of the 
identified performance indicators, while fulfilling constraints such as those regarding safety and regulatory 
requirements. In practice, this multi-objective optimization problem has to be faced in a situation in which 
some constraints and/or the objective functions are affected by uncertainty. To effectively tackle this 
problem, a number of approaches have been already propounded in the literature considering different 
framework for uncertainty representation: probability distributions in [22]-[24], fuzzy sets in [25] and [26], 
and plausibility and belief functions in [27], [28]. 
The present work aims at contributing to the above step i) by developing a methodology for maintenance 
performance assessment that properly processes the involved uncertainties. More specifically, we consider a 
situation in which: 
 a stochastic model of the life of the component of interest, in terms of degradation process, failure 
behavior and maintenance interventions is known without any uncertainty. This is, for example, 
the case for the degradation process ‘fatigue’ which has been successfully modeled by means of 
gamma processes [29], Weibull distributions [30], Paris-Erdogan law [31], etc.  
 The model of the component’s behavior depends on a number of ill-defined parameters. With 
reference to the example of fatigue degradation, the gamma process, Weibull distribution and 
Paris-Erdogan law depend on parameters whose values are usually not precisely known. 
Moreover, knowledge of other model parameters such as those describing the maintenance 
effectiveness (e.g., the improvement of the component degradation), duration and cost may also 
be imprecise. This framework of analysis where the aleatory and epistemic components of the 
uncertainty are separated into two hierarchical levels is often referred to as ‘level 2’ approach or 
setting [38]. 
 Information about the ill-defined parameters is available only from experts; in particular, it is 
assumed that there is a single expert, who provides for every uncertain parameter a set of 
intervals, which contain its true value with different degrees of possibility. 
Although methods for a priori evaluating the performance of a maintenance policy while taking into account 
the aleatory uncertainty on the future behavior of the component of interest have been investigated in the 
literature (see [32]-[35] for surveys), only few works (e.g., [36]) tackle the maintenance policy performance 
assessment problem considering the epistemic uncertainty on the maintenance model parameters. In this 
work, the information elicited from the expert is described by means of possibility distributions and 
propagated through the model by resorting to a method that exploits the concept of FRVs [3], [37] and 
DSTE. 
Notice that other techniques have been proposed in the literature to represent the imprecision in the expert 
qualitative statements. For example, type-2 fuzzy theory allows describing the uncertainty in the model 
parameters given by the expert by means of a fuzzy set, and also the uncertainty in the shape of its 
membership function, again by a fuzzy set [39]. This latter would introduce the ‘third-level’ uncertainty in 
our framework, which requires additional computational complexity to propagate the epistemic uncertainty 
described by the type-2 fuzzy set together with the aleatory uncertainty. Furthermore, this solution leaves 
open the question: shall we consider the uncertainty in the membership defining the type-2 fuzzy set? 
A different approach to the problem of assessing the maintenance performance while properly processing 
the involved uncertainties has been proposed by the authors in [21], [40], where the uncertainty in the 
model parameters is represented by resorting to the DSTE theory. In particular, the main differences 
between this latter approach and that presented in this work are outlined in [21], with respect to the 
information elicited, the readability of the output, the computational effort required and the possibility of 
passing from the PT-FRV-based method to the DSTE-based one. 
The method proposed in this work is illustrated with reference to an exponential, non-repairable, binary 
component. A practical case study is shown with reference to the degradation model of a check valve of a 
turbo-pump lubricating system in a Nuclear Power Plant. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the method to represent and 
propagate the uncertainties. Section 3 illustrates a case study, which is for reference firstly investigated 
assuming that there is no epistemic uncertainty affecting the parameters of the stochastic model. The FRV-
based method is then applied in Section 4 to this case study to treat epistemic uncertainty. Finally, a 
discussion on the pros and cons of the method, as emerged from its application to the case study, concludes 
the work. The main aspects of DSTE and PT are briefly recalled in Appendix 1 for completeness of the 
paper. 
2 Uncertainty setting 
Let us consider a model Z=g(Y), where Z=(Z1, Z2,…, ZO) is the vector containing the O output variables of 
interest, and  g   is a function that models how Z depends on the k uncertain variables , 1, ,jY j k , of 
vector Y; the uncertainty on these variables is characterized by known probability distributions ( ; )
jY j j
F y θ , 
1,2, ,j k , where 
,1 ,
{ ,..., }
jj j j M
 θ , are the vectors containing the hyper-parameters of the 
corresponding probability distributions. Also these parameters are uncertain and the information to 
characterize this uncertainty is drawn from an expert. This framework of analysis where the aleatory and 
epistemic components of the uncertainty are separated into two hierarchical levels is often referred to as 
‘level 2’ approach or setting [39]. 
As mentioned, information is elicited from an expert for estimating the parameters , 1,...,j j kθ . The 
associated uncertainty is represented within the framework of PT, and propagated by means of the method 
based on the concept of FRVs. For the sake of clarity of the illustration, the treatment of uncertainty is 
described by ways of a simple case study concerning a non-repairable component whose state can only be 
either working or failed and whose Time To Failure (TTF) is exponentially distributed with uncertain failure 
rate  . The mission time is T (taken equal to 105h in the numerical case study). Hence, in this reference 
example there is k=1 uncertain variable, i.e., Y=(Y1)=(TTF), described by the Cumulative Distribution 
Function (CDF) ( ; ) 1 ttf
TTF
F ttf e     , with 1 1M   uncertain parameter 1 { }θ . The output vector Z 
contains only one variable: the portion D of the mission time in which the component is in a down state, i.e., 














Then, D is also a random variable, because it is a function of the random variable TTF. The range of 
variability of D is the interval [0,1], and its distribution, for a given value of the failure rate  , is: 
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  2. 
where d represents the generic value taken by the variable D. 
Figure 1 shows the shape of this function for a value of the failure rate 5 110λ h  . Notice that (0)DF  (i.e., 
the probability that the component is always available during the mission time) is equal to λTe , i.e., the 
probability that the component fails after T. 
 
Figure 1: CDF of D, for λ=10-5h-1 
2.1 Information elicited from the expert 
Within the PT framework, for a generic uncertain parameter  , an expert is asked to provide a set of n  
nested intervals 
i
A , 1,...,i n , (
1 2 n
A A ... A   ), which are believed to contain the true value of   with a 
positive confidence level 
i
q ; this latter can be conveniently interpreted as the smallest (subjective) 
probability that the true value of the parameter   lies within 
i
A  (i.e., ( )
i i
P A q  ). Alternatively, the 
interval 
i
A  can be seen as the smallest one whose probability of including the true value of   is at least iq  
[41], for any 1i ,...,n . From the expert’s point of view, iq  is the portion of cases where iA   from 
his/her experience [41]. To sum up, the expert provides a weighted family 
1 1 2 2 n
{( , ),( , ),....,( , )}
n
A q A q A q  (for 
example, see Figure 2 (a)). Notice also that the value of the largest confidence level 
n
q  may be smaller than 
1, i.e., 1nq ε  , 0ε  ; this is equivalent to admitting that even the widest, safest interval contains some 
residual uncertainty ( ε ), i.e., it is assumed that the expert is not absolutely sure about his judgment [41].  




q q q    hold, due to the fact that iq of the interval iA  is necessarily 
smaller than 
1i
q   associated to 1iA  , if 1i iA A , for any i=1,…, n-1. 
 
Figure 2: representation of the weighted families provided by the expert for the exponential, non-repairable, binary component 
(a) and the corresponding possibility distribution, built according to the procedure proposed in [43] (b) 
With reference to the simple case study of the exponential, non-repairable, binary component, let us suppose 
that the expert characterizes his/her knowledge about the value of the failure rate   with the information 
summarized in Table 1.  
Parameters 











min max min max min  max min max min max 
  [h-1] 9.9e-6 1.01e-5 9.7e-6 1.03e-5 9.5e-6 1.05e-5 9e-6 1.1e-5 8e-6 1.2e-5 
Table 1: information supposed to be elicited from the expert for the case study concerning the exponential, non-repairable, 
binary component 
The Universe of Discourse (UoD), i.e., the interval of all the possible values of the failure rate is [0, [ , 
where the lower bound (0) corresponds to an infallible component, whereas an infinite failure rate 




that is believed to normally, unsurprisingly contain the true failure rate value, with confidence level 
1
0.1q  , which represents the portion of cases where 
1
λ A  from the expert’s experience point of view. The 
interval 
1
A =[9.9e-6h-1, 1.01e-5h-1] is ‘unsurprising’ in the sense that any interval *
1
A  of the same length of 
1
A  would have been associated to an equal or smaller frequency of occurrence of the event *
1
A . 
Obviously, the expert cannot be less confident that the true value of the failure rate belongs to intervals that 
include 
1
A ; thus, larger intervals are associated to larger confidence levels. In particular, 
5
A =[8e-6h-1,1.2e-
5h-1] is the interval which leaves a 0 05ε .  probability of not including the true value of  . 
Figure 2(a) reports the set of intervals provided by the expert, and corresponding confidence levels (degrees 
of certainty). For visualization, both Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) report only the interval [1e-6h-1,1e-4h-1], 
instead of the entire UoD, and the abscissa axes are logarithmically scaled.  
From Figure 2(b), it also emerges that the elicitation process should be checked against the overconfidence 
problem, which intervenes when judges provide intervals such that they were X% sure that the correct 
answer lay between them, but the correct answer fell inside their intervals much less than X% of the time. In 
this respect, the results of the study in [44] allow stating that the overconfidence problem is reduced or 
avoided when experts assign a reasonably accurate level of confidence to a given interval. On the contrary, 
when experts are asked to give an interval corresponding to a target assigned level of confidence the 
correctness of the judgment worsens. Thus, the findings in [44] seem to support the elicitation method 
proposed in this work. 
With respect to the elicitation exercise of failure rates, a practical difficulty is given by the typically very low 
failure rate values (even lower than 10-6  which are difficult to directly assess resorting to expert knowledge. 
Alternatively, the experts can assess the mean time between failures, which is equal to the inverse of 
the failure rate and can be obtained from the ratio between the total time of observation and the 
number of failures occurred in such time span [45]. 
 
Notice that the elicitation exercise of the failure rate is not difficult from the expert point of view. In 
fact, it can be derived as the inverse of  
More generally, in the uncertainty setting with k variables, an expert is asked to provide for every 1j ,...,k  
and 1 jp ,...,M , a set of ,j pn  nested intervals 
j,p
i
A , 1 j,pi ,...,n , ( 1 2 j,p
j,p j,p j,p
n
A A ... A   ), which are 





2.2 Uncertainty representation 
In this work, the uncertainty on the information elicited from the experts is represented by resorting to 
the possibility theory (see Appendix 1). With respect to an uncertain generic parameter  , the possibility 
theory defines, for a given set A, the possibility and necessity measures, ( )A  and ( )N A , which can be 
interpreted as the upper and lower limits of the probability that the true value of the parameter belongs to A. 
These two measures are related to the possibility distribution ( )  , which expresses the degree of 
possibility that the true value of the uncertain parameter be  , by: 






             3. 
( ) 1 ( ( )) 1 sup{ ( )}
A




             4. 
In our case, a possibility distribution is directly built from the weighted families 
1 1 2 2
{( , ),( , ),....,( , )}
n n
A q A q A q  provided by the expert, according to the procedure proposed in [41] and whose 
steps are here briefly recalled, for convenience. 
 First of all, it is postulated that the necessity measure, ( )
i
N A , i.e., the lower probability that the true 
value of   is in the interval 
i
A , is equal to the confidence level 
i
q  defined by the expert. Thus, the 
inequality ( ) ( )
i i i
P A N A q    holds, for any 1,...,i n . 
 Then, since there are infinite possibility distributions ( )   that obey the constraint i iq N(A ) , it 
has been decided to choose the one which maximizes the degree of possibility ( )   for all the 
values  . The solution is unique and is [4]: 
1
1













        5. 
In particular, it is possible to show that this is the least specific possibility distribution with respect to the 
available data, i.e., any other possibility distribution '  obeying the constraints iN(A )iq   is such that 
'    [4]. 
With reference to the case of the exponential, non-repairable, binary component, the possibility distribution 
  of the failure rate λ associated to the weighted family of Table 1 and built according to the procedure 
depicted above, is reported in Figure 2(b). To verify that this distribution obeys the constraints  i iq N A  
for 1,...,5i  , let us consider, for example, the first interval 1A ; then, 
   
1
1 1 1
1 1 sup{ ( )} 1 0 9 0 1
A




       . Notice also the residual uncertainty 0 05ε .  
associated to the points of the UoD external to 
5
A . 
2.3 Uncertainty propagation  
The uncertainty in the parameters of the model needs to be propagated to assess the uncertainty on the 
outputs. To this aim, we exploit the concept of FRVs within the methodology proposed in [3]. FRVs can be 
intuitively conceptualized as random variables whose values are not real numbers, but fuzzy numbers, since 
there is a vague perception of their true values, which are crisp but unobservable [37]. In other words, a FRV 
is a generalization of a random variable or a fuzzy variable [42]. 
The operative steps of the uncertainty propagation procedure are reported in the following with reference to 
the case of the exponential, non-repairable, binary component. Since this case is characterized by a single 
uncertain variable (k=1), we will always omit in the notations the subscript 1 referred to the uncertain 
variable. As an example, the general procedure is given with reference to the sample vector { }
j
u , but in our 
example we indicate it by { }u . 
1) For each uncertain variable 
j
Y , 1,2, ,j k , sample a vector { }ju
  1,2, , TN  , made of NT 
uniform random numbers in [0,1[; for example in our case, since k=1, we need a vector of random 
numbers { }u

, 1,2, , TN  . In particular, let us assume that the first sampled value 
1u = 0.65. 
2) Select a value of αi on [0,1] and take as intervals of possible values the cuts
,1 ,,1 ,
[ , ] {[ , ] ,...,[ , ] }ji i j ij j j Mj j j Mθ θ θ θ  θ θ  




jj j j M
 θ , of the variables jY , 1,2, ,j k ; in our case, let us start from αi=1: 
the interval of possible values for the parameter   is [9.9e-6h-1,1.01e-5h-1] (see Figure 2 (b)). 




 , of the variables jY , 1,...,j k , corresponding to the 
random vector 
1
{ ,..., ,..., }
j k
u u u   , using the αi-cut ,1 ,,1 ,[ , ] {[ , ] ,...,[ , ] }ji i j ij j j Mj j j Mθ θ θ θ  θ θ , found at 
step 2). In particular, the ω-th random interval of the j-th variable, 
1 1
[ , ] [ , ]
[ , ] [ inf ( ; ), sup ( ; )]
i j j
jj ij jj ij
j Y j j Y j jj







θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ , where 
1( ; )
jY j j
F u θ  is the quasi-inverse 
function of the CDF ( ; )
jY j j
F y θ  of the random variable jY , for any value of the vector jθ  (i.e., if U 
is a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1[, then 
1( ; )
jY j
F U θ  has CDF ( ; )
jY j j
F y θ ). This 
procedure can be regarded as an extension of the Monte Carlo (MC) sampling method, modified to 
take into account the fact that the parameters of the CDFs are fuzzy-uncertain in their UoDs: each 
sample from the uniform distribution is associated to an interval of values, instead of a single value 
(Figure 3), so that different CDFs are obtained from the sampling, and lower and an upper bounding 
CDFs can be identified. 
In the reference case study, the interval associated to the sample 
1 0 65u .  and αi=1 is 1[ , ]ttf ttf
=[1.63e5h, 1.66e5h] (Figure 3(a)). This is obtained by considering the two extremes of the interval 
of the uncertain parameter λ equal to 1[ , ]θ θ =[9.9e-6h
-1,1.01e-5h-1], which define the upper and 
lower exponential distributions, 1 te   and 1 te  , respectively. Then, these functions are inverted 
to find the interval 
1
[ , ]ttf ttf , which is given by: 
1 1
1
ln(1 ) ln(1 )




   
 . 
Notice that in this particular case, the interval 1[ , ]ttf ttf  is trivially obtained, since the inverse 
function of the exponential distribution is known. In general, it may be difficult to find out the 
analytical expression of the minimum and maximum values of the inverse function 
1( ; )
jY j
F U θ , 
especially if it depends on a large number of parameters (e.g., Mj>4, 5). In these cases, one has to 
devise efficient methods for identifying the minimum and maximum values of the random variable 
corresponding to the different combinations of the uncertain parameters 
,1 ,,1 ,
[ , ] {[ , ] ,...,[ , ] }ji i j ij j j Mj j j Mθ θ θ θ  θ θ . 
 
 Figure 3: lower and upper CDFs corresponding to different values of αi, and the intervals associated by the quasi-
inverse functions to u1=0.65  










g  , respectively), within the intervals [ , ] ijjy y

 , 1,2, ,j k , of the variables: 
1
, [ , ]





j y y y





         6. 
1
, [ , ]







j y y y




          7. 
for o=1,...,O, and consider the interval: 





             8. 
In the case of the exponential, non-repairable, binary component, the minimum and maximum values 
of the TTF found in the previous step (i.e., 1.63e5h and 1.66e5h, respectively) are both larger than 
the mission time T=105h, and thus the corresponding values of D are zero (Equation 1). 
5) Return to step 2) and repeat steps 3) and 4) for another α-cut. For the exponential, non-repairable, 





ttf ttf   corresponding to different values of αi are reported in 
Figure 3. For example in the case of αi = 0.5, 
11
1 0.51
[ , ]ttf ttf =[9.54 104h,1.16 105h], whereas for αi = 
0.05 the interval 
11
1 0.051
[ , ]ttf ttf  =[0,∞[. 
6) The FRV corresponding to the ω-th realization is computed as: 
( )
( ) sup[ [0,1] | ( )]o
o i
Z
Z o i o
z z              9. 
The FRV that describes the portion of the component downtime associated to the first sample is 




   it is fully plausible that the component is available for the 




   it is not impossible that the component is 
unavailable for the entire mission time. Furthermore, according to the probabilistic interpretation of 
the possibility distribution, it is possible to observe that the probability that the component is fully 
available during its mission time is between 0.5 and 1, and the probability that the portion of 
downtimes is larger than 0.07 is between 0 and 0.2. Notice that the FRV of Figure 4 is consistent 
with the intervals represented in Figure 3. In fact, only the intervals corresponding to αi≤0.5 contain 
the value T=105h: this means that only for these values of αi the component may experience a failure 
before T, which entails its unavailability for the remaining part of the mission time. 
7) Repeat steps 1)-6) for a new realization of the random variables, until ω=NT.  
 
Figure 4: Fuzzy Random Variable corresponding to the sample u1=0.65 
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10. 
where 1/NT is the probability assigned to the ω-th FRV, for any ω. In particular, Equation 10 is 
derived from the interpretation of the FRVs under the setting of random sets [43]. 
The Plausibility and Belief distributions of D (i.e., the upper and lower bounds, respectively, of the 
probability distributions of the portion of the mission time T in which the exponential, non-repairable, binary 
component is in a fault state) are reported in Figure 5; for comparison, the CDF (see Equation. 2) is also 
provided, which lies between the Plausibility and Belief distributions. 
A comment seems in order about the requirement that the uncertainties on all the input parameters must be 
described by the same expert, which is mandatory for applying this procedure. This constraint comes from 
the application of the extension principle in Equation 9, which introduces a strong dependence between the 
information sources supplying the input possibility distributions. Indeed, the same confidence level for all 
the input variables is chosen to build the α-cuts of the output variables; this suggests that if the expert source 
informing on one parameter is rather precise or gives the same mean values to the confidence levels, then the 
one informing on another parameter must also be precise, i.e., to ensure this, it must be the same source. 
Further research effort should be spent in order to verify whether the procedure here illustrated can be 
interpreted as a conservative counterpart to the calculus of probabilistic variables under stochastic 
independence, due to the dependence between the choice of confidence levels. 
 
Figure 5: Plausibility, Belief and Cumulative distributions of the portion of mission time in which the component is in a fault state 
3 Case Study 
The present case study is taken from [46] and regards the degradation and maintenance of a check valve of a 
turbo-pump lubricating system in a Nuclear Power Plant. The degradation modelling is based on information 
collected from dependability analyses (e.g., FMECA) or directly from experts. This leads to the 
identification of one principal degradation mechanism, i.e., fatigue, and only one failure mode, i.e., rupture. 
A Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) policy is applied to this component on a time horizon T = 104h. The 
performance of the maintenance policy is assessed in terms of cost and component unavailability. 
Notice that the case study proposed in this work is derived from a real industrial issue addressed by the 
authors. However, the values of the parameters of the degradation - failure model considered in this Section 
have been arbitrarily set. In fact, the focus of the paper is on the method proposed to cope with the issue of 
assessing a maintenance policy in the presence of uncertainty in the model parameters, rather than on the 
findings of the case study. 
3.1 Degradation mechanism modeling 
The fatigue phenomenon affecting the check valve is here modeled as a discrete-state, continuous-time 
stochastic process that evolves among the following three degradation levels (Figure 6): 
1. ‘Good’: a component in this state is new or almost new (no crack is detectable by maintenance 
operators). 
2. ‘Medium’: if the component is in this degradation level, then it is convenient to replace it. 
3. ‘Bad’: a component in this degradation state is very likely to experience a failure in few working 
hours. 
The choice of describing the degradation process by means of a small number of levels, or degradation 
‘macro-states’, is driven by industrial practice: experts usually adopt a discrete and qualitative classification 
of the degradation states based on qualitative interpretations of symptoms. 
The probability density functions (pdfs) of the transition times are Weibull distributions, with scale 
parameters ηij and shape parameters βij for the transitions from state i to state j (i, j  {1, 2, 3}, and i<j). The 
Weibull distribution is commonly applied in fracture mechanics (e.g., [30]), especially under the weakest-
link assumption [47]. 
A further state, ‘Failed’, can be reached from every degradation state upon the occurrence of a shock event. 
The exponential distribution with constant failure rate λj describes the failure behaviour of the component 
while it is in state j, for every j=1, 2, 3. The choice of assigning a constant failure rate to every degradation 
state is driven by industrial practice: experts are familiar with this setting and comfortable with providing 
information about the failure rates values. 
 
 
Figure 6: degradation modeling 
3.2 Maintenance policy 
The CBM policy applied to the system is composed by the following tasks: 
 Inspections: these actions, which are the only scheduled actions, are aimed at detecting the degradation 
state of the component, and are considered to last 5h for a cost of 50€. For the sake of simplicity, the 
component is considered as new after the inspection. 
 CBM actions: Preventive Maintenance (PM) actions which are dependent on the result of an inspection 
action. More precisely, if the component is found to be in state ‘Good’, no action is performed, whereas if 
the degradation state is ‘Medium’ or ‘Bad’, then the component is replaced and, consequently, the 
degradation state is taken back to ‘Good’. Both these replacement actions are supposed to take 25h and 
cost 500€, each.  
 Corrective Maintenance (CM) actions. The corrective action, performed after a component failure, is 
assumed to be the replacement of the component. Due to the fact that this event is unscheduled, this 
action brings an additional duration of 85h and an additional cost of 3500€, with respect to the 
replacement after an inspection, leading to a total duration of 100h and to a total cost of 4000€. In 
particular, the additional time may be caused by the supplementary time needed for performing the 
procedure of replacement after failure or to the time elapsed between the occurrence of the failure and the 
start of the replacement actions. 
The Inspection Interval (II), which is the time span between two successive planned inspections, is the only 
decision variable considered in this case study; optimization is then directed to the search for the value of the 
II that minimizes the costs and maximizes the availability of the component. 
Notice that to keep the case study presented in this work consistent with the practical industrial problem 
tackled by the authors, the values of duration and cost of the different maintenance actions are given 
proportional to the actual ones. 
3.3 Analysis of the case study 
The case study is firstly investigated in the unrealistic situation in which the values of the model parameters 
,j p
 , 1j ,...,k  and 1 jp ,...,M  
are assumed to be exactly known (i.e., there is no epistemic uncertainty). 
Table 2 reports the values of these parameters, which have been taken from [46].  
 
Parameters Nominal Values 
1,1 12
  , 1861h 
1,2 12
   8 
2,1 23
   743h 
2,2 23
   8 
3,1 1
   10-6h-1 
4,1 2
   10-4h-1 
5,1 3
   10-2h-1 
Table 2: Parameters of the probability distributions 
Figure 7 shows the CDF of the portion of the mission time in which the component is unavailable. Two main 
steps can be observed, which can be explained by imaging to have a population of identical components. 
According to the MC simulation, almost 60% of the population experience one out of the following two 
behaviors. 
 The component never fails during the mission time, and thus is inspected 4 times (at t=2000h, 
4000h, 6000h and 8000h); in 3 out of these 4 inspections the component is found in degradation 
states Medium or Bad (75h of downtime) and in the remaining one in degradation state Good (5h of 
downtime). Thus, the total downtime is 80h, which constitutes the 0.8% of T. Components 
experiencing this life explain the CDF step in correspondence of  d=0.008. 
 The component never fails during the mission time, and when inspected is always found in 
degradation states Medium or Bad (100h of downtime). This behavior explains the CDF step in 
correspondence of d=0.01. 
 Figure 7: CDF of the portion of the time horizon in which the component is in a down state 
Notice that it is possible to lump together the information provided by the cumulative distribution of the 
portion of downtimes into the mean value of the distribution, i.e., the average unavailability over the mission 
time, which provides an useful and easy to be interpreted indicator of the component expected state in the 
mission time. The estimated average unavailability is 0.011, and the related 68.3% confidence intervals is 
[0.011-9.8e-8, 0.011+9.8e-8].  
3.4  Maintenance optimization 
Figure 8 shows the estimated average unavailability of the component over the mission time (i.e., the 
mean value of the component downtime over the entire mission time), with the related 68.3% confidence 
interval, for different values of the II. The narrowness of the confidence intervals is due to the large number 
(5*104) of MC simulations performed in this case study; roughly speaking, the larger this number the smaller 
the (confidence) interval that with a given probability (confidence level) contains the true value of the 
estimated variable. Thus, in the present case study the actual value of the average unavailability over the 
mission time is affected by a small amount of error, which can be reduced by increasing the number of 
simulations. 
 Figure 8: average unavailability corresponding to different Inspection Intervals 
Initially, there is a decreasing behavior that reaches a minimum in correspondence of II=1000h/1500h; 
after this point, the unavailability starts rapidly increasing. This is the result of two conflicting trends: on one 
side, the more frequent are the inspections the larger is the probability to find the component in degradation 
states Medium and Bad: this prevents the component to fail and thus saves the corresponding large time to 
repair. On the other side, frequent replacements are ineffective, since the component life is not completely 
exploited in this case. The minimum at II=1500h represents the optimal balance between these two 
tendencies. 
Figure 9 shows that the maintenance costs associated to different choices of the II have a shape similar to 
that of the mean unavailability. Thus, one may conclude that under the considered maintenance policy, the 
best II is between 1000h and 1500h with respect to both availability and cost objectives. On the other hand, 
both the mean unavailability and the maintenance cost remain small, with little variations, when the value of 
the II ranges in the interval [1000h, 2000h]. This relative flatness of both performance indicators 
(unavailability and cost) allows a certain freedom to choose the II within such range: other criteria (e.g., 
opportunistic maintenance) not included in this analysis can be taken into account if the related advantages 
recover the small losses due to the increase of unavailability and cost, that would be incurred when moving 
away from the optimal value of 1500h. 
 Figure 9: mean costs corresponding to different Inspection Intervals 
4 Representation and propagation of the uncertainties in the considered 
case study 
The aim of this Section is to apply the method illustrated in Section 2 to the case study described above, 
when the parameters of the distributions that model the transitions of the component among the four states of 
Figure 6 are ill-defined and there is only one expert who estimates their values. To sum up, the uncertainty 
situation is the following:  
 there are k=5 uncertain variables, which define the 5 transition times reported in Table 3. 
 The distributions associated to the variables are known, and depend on the set of the uncertain 
parameters θj, j=1…,5 reported in Table 3. In turn, there are Nu=7 uncertain parameters, which 
are the shape and scale parameters of the two Weibull distributions and the failure rates pertaining 








Y   1 1,1 1,2, θ  Transition time from degradation level ‘Good’ to ‘Medium’  
2
Y   2 2,1 2,2, θ  Transition time from degradation level ‘Medium’ to ‘Bad’ 
3
Y   3 3,1θ  Transition time from degradation level ‘Good’ to ‘Failed’ 
4
Y   4 4,1θ  Transition time from degradation level ‘Medium’ to ‘Failed’ 
5
Y   5 5,1θ  Transition time from degradation level ‘Bad’ to ‘Failed’ 
Table 3: tailoring of the general model to the considered case study 
Notice that the simulation of a single MC history (steps 1-5 of the procedure in Section 2.3) requires that the 
model g encodes a number of random variables k>>5, since the history corresponding to a given sample of 
these 5 uncertain times in general do not cover the entire time horizon T. For example (Figure 10 (a)), if the 
first transition is from state 1 to state ‘Failed’ and occurs at t=2000h, then the interval time between 
t=2000h+100h (i.e., the time instant at the end of the repair action that starts after the failure) and T remains 
not investigated. This problem can be overcome by thinking of g as a function that depends on a number K of 
5-ple (the 5 probabilistic variables), and not just on 5 variables. Obviously, the number K that allows to cover 
the entire mission time is also a random variable, since it depends on the sampled times, which produce 
histories of different lengths. However, this is not a problem in practice: the number K can be chosen such 
that it is reasonably sure that the sampled times simulate histories of duration larger than the time horizon T. 
Then, the analysis focuses only on the interval [0, T] (Figure 10(b)). Finally, the output vector Z is made up 
of the portion of T in which the component is unavailable, and the cost associated to the maintenance policy 
to be assessed; thus O=2. 
4.1 Single expert information 
In all generality, the difficulty in estimating the uncertain parameters of the model may heavily vary from 
one case to another; the weighted families 
1 1 2 2
{ }
j,p j,p
j,p j,p j,p j,p j,p j,p
n n
(A ,q ),(A ,q ),....,(A ,q )  provided by the expert to 
represent his/her knowledge about the parameters are expected to reflect this difference.  
In regard to the considered case study, the weighted families elicited from the single expert are reported in 
Table 4. It is assumed that he/she is able to infer the information on the transition times between the different 
states, from the observations gathered during past component inspections. For example, let us suppose that a 
component is monitored every 100h, and that it was found in degradation state Medium a t=1800h; if the 
component is found in degradation state Bad upon the next observation at t=1900h, then the expert acquires 
the information that the transition from degradation state Medium to Bad occurred in the interval ]1800h, 
1900h[. This kind of information can be used to define the scale and shape parameters of the Weibull 
distributions representing these transitions. In this respect, remind that the scale factor of a Weibull 
distribution is by definition the time before which almost 65% (i.e., 63,2%) of the components of an 
homogeneous population have experienced a transition, whereas the shape factor, roughly speaking, 
determines the uncertainty around the scale value. Notice, however, that the amount of uncertainty affecting 
the estimations of the scale and shape parameters is expected to be very different: the expert has a more 
refined knowledge on the scale parameter as it can be seen as the 65th percentile, than on the shape 
parameter which is only related to the slopes of the Weibull probability plots; these are expected to be 
difficult to estimate from the observations of the components’ degradation states during the inspections. 
Anyway, it is the authors’ experience that in some cases (e.g., the degradation behaviour of some 
components of the turbines used in the Oil&Gas industry), the experts of the maintenance engineering 
department have a relatively precise knowledge about the values of the shape factors. 













Good Medium Good 
Good 
Failure 
Figure 10:Two examples of simulated histories: the number of random variables does not suffice to cover the entire time horizon 
T (a); number K allows to simulate histories longer than T (b) 
,1
j pq =0.1 ,
2
j pq =0.5 ,
3
j pq =0.95 UoD 
min max min max min max Min max 
1,1
  η12 1843 1880 1815 1908 1720 2001 1700 2020 
1,2
  β12     7.5 8.5 7 9 
2,1
  η23 735 750 725 762 687 800 650 850 
2,2
  β23     7.5 8.5 7 9 
3,1
  λ1     9e-7 1.1e-6 1e-7 5e-6 
4,1
  λ2     9e-5 1.1e-4 1e-5 5e-4 
5,1
  λ3     0.9e-2 1.1e-2 0.85e-2 1.15e-2 
Table 4: Confidence levels and associated intervals 
With regards to the scale parameters (rows 4 and 6 of Table 4), it has been assumed that the expert provides 
three nested intervals corresponding to the confidence levels 
1
0 1j,pq . , 
2
0 5j,pq .  and 
3
0 95j,pq . , {1,2}j   
and 1p  , and the UoDs within which these parameters range.  
With regards to the shape parameters (rows 5 and 7 of Table 4), given the difficulty in their estimation, it has 
been assumed that the expert provides just the UoDs and the intervals corresponding to the confidence level 
3
0 95j,pq . . In particular, the UoDs, which contain the true values of the parameters with probability 1, are 
very large: the expert tends to reduce the sets of values that surely do not contain the true values of the scale 
parameters.  
Finally, with reference to the failure rates, also the estimation of the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF, i.e., the 
inverse of the failure rate) of the components in a given degradation state may not be easy; in fact, failure 
from the first degradation state is usually a rare event, whose frequency is difficult to estimate even in a 
qualitative way, whereas the lack of precise knowledge of the time instants in which the components transit 
towards the other degradation states affects the evaluation of the mean times to failure associated to these 
states; that is, if the time instant since one has to start to count is unknown, then the resulting measure of the 
time to failure is biased, especially if the component is rarely inspected. Thus, a more vague description of 
the uncertainty is provided by the expert for these parameters of the model g. Namely, he/she gives just the 
intervals corresponding to the 0.95 confidence level and the UoD, as for the scale parameters of the Weibull 
distributions. The extreme points of these intervals are reported in rows 8 -10, columns 7-10 of Table 4. 
On the other side, the larger the number of the uncertain parameters, the larger the space in which the 
maxima and minima of the function g in Equations 6 and 7 have to be searched for, and the larger the 
required computational time. In this regard, a sensitivity analysis can be preventively performed in order to 
identify which are the input parameters whose variations lead to smaller changes in the output value; this 
allows to neglect the uncertainty affecting these parameters while losing a small amount of information and 
considerably reducing the computational times. 
In the present case study, the sensitivity analysis is performed by a local approach [51], i.e., the uncertain 
parameters of the model are varied one by one within their UoD, while the other parameters take their 
nominal values. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 5: the portion of T in which the component 
is unavailable is estimated in correspondence of the extreme values of the UoD of every uncertain parameter. 
For example, the estimation of D is 0.0142 in correspondence of the lower bound of the UoD of the scale 
parameter of the first Weibull distribution (1700h), whereas it is 0.0082 in correspondence of the upper 
bound (2020h). In particular, these values are reported with the related 68.3% confidence interval. The last 
column of the Table reports Δ, i.e., the differences between the average unavailability corresponding to the 
two limiting situations. These quantities give an estimation of the amount of output uncertainty (i.e., the 
unavailability uncertainty) due to the variation of the model parameters. In practice, high values of Δ indicate 
the importance of properly considering the uncertainty in the parameters, whereas low values correspond to 
parameters whose uncertainty has no remarkable effect on the model output uncertainty. 
In this case, the failure rate associated to the degradation state ‘Bad’ turns out to be the parameter which the 
model is less sensitive to. Then, the uncertainty affecting this parameter is not considered and the nominal 
value (Table 2) is assigned to it.  
Notice that the set of unavailability values reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 are not useful for 
representing the uncertainty on the unavailability, which must take into account not only the input parameter 
extreme values, but all the available information on the input parameter uncertainties, i.e., the possibility 
distributions. Thus, the sensitivity analysis here proposed cannot substitute the uncertainty representation and 
propagation tasks carried out in this work, but can be used to identify the input parameters whose uncertainty 
is most relevant. To further clarify this issue, we can say that the difference between the results in Table 5 
and those of the approach proposed in this work to represent and propagate the uncertainty is twofold: on one 
hand, the PT-FRV based method is a global method to propagate the uncertainty [51]; on the other hand, the 
possibility distributions used to represent the uncertainty in the model parameters allow having a smaller 
commitment of the information provided by the expert.  
Table 5: results of the local sensitivity analysis 
Parameter Minima Maxima Δ 
η12 0.0142±1.2e-7 0.0082±8.3e-8 6.0e-3 
β12 0.0116±1.1e-7 0.0108±8.8e-8 0.8e-3 
η23 0.0119±1.0e-7 0.0105±8.7e-8 1.4e-3 
β23 0.0112±9.9e-8 0.0110±1.2e-7 0.2e-3 
λ1 0.0110±9.5e-8 0.0114±9.6e-8 0.4e-3 
λ2 0.0103±8.2e-8 0.0144±1.4e-7 4.1e-3 
λ3 0.0110±9.5e-8 0.0111±8.8e-8 0.1e-4 
Finally, notice that for every uncertain parameter and for any confidence level, the value considered in [46] 
is the middle point of the corresponding intervals provided by the expert. 
4.2 Possibilistic representation of the epistemic uncertainties 
Figure 11 reports the possibility distributions of the uncertain parameters of the case study, corresponding to 
the weighted families of Table 4. These are obtained by applying the procedure showed in Section 2.2.  
4.3 Uncertainty propagation 
Figure 12 shows the results obtained by applying the FRVs-based method to the considered case study. The 
Plausibility and Belief distributions of the portion of the mission time in which the component is in a down 
state are quite distant; this shows that for some favorable combinations of the uncertain parameters the 
system results to be much more available than for other combinations of the uncertain parameters which lead 
to high portions of downtime. Notice also that the Plausibility and Belief distributions bracket the CDF found 
the case in which the uncertainty on the model parameters is not accounted for (Section 3.3). 
 
 Figure 11: possibility distributions of the uncertain parameters of the case study 
Notice that the results provided by the method discussed in this work are difficult to be interpreted. This is 
due to the fact that, differently from the case of no uncertainty, it is not possible to lump together the 
information provided by the method, i.e., the Plausibility and Belief function, into indicators such as their 
mean values which can be easily interpreted. This impossibility is due to the fact that the DSTE does not 
allow to define the mean value of an uncertain variable. However, in order to give an interpretation to the 
obtained results, one can focus on a given percentile of the belief and plausibility distributions. For example, 
the interval bounded by the values of the 95th percentile of the Plausibility and Belief distributions is [0.015, 
0.026]; the extremes of this interval constitute the lower and upper bounds, respectively, of the 95th 
percentile of the portion of downtime in the mission time. In other words, this interval tells us that the 95% 
chance of the downtime of the component can be nor smaller than 1.5% nor larger than 2.6% of the mission 
time. Thus, if one is interested in the worst case, then he/she can assume that the 95th percentile of the 
downtime is 0.026, whereas in a more optimistic view, it can be valued at 0.015.  
 
Figure 12: Plausibility and Belief distributions of the portion of mission time in which the component is unavailable, and the CDF 
corresponding to the case with no uncertainty. 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 report the Plausibility and Belief distributions of the portion of downtime over the 
mission time and the total cost, respectively, corresponding to three different values of the II, i.e., II=1000h, 
II=1500h and II=2000h. These results do not lend themselves to an easy interpretation and do not allow to 
make a decision in a simple way. Indeed, while it is easy to state that inspecting the component every 1000h 
is better than every 2000h, since these distributions are not overlapped, answering the question ‘which value 
of the II is best?’ is not trivial, as the distributions corresponding to II=1500h and II=1000h are overlapped. 
This calls for devising a method in support of maintenance decision makers, to help them get around these 
distributions. Notice also that the small amount of uncertainty on the values of both downtime and cost, 
when the component is inspected every 1000h, derives from the fact that the ‘crowd’ of the simulated MC 
component histories (i.e., the large number of components experiencing the same behavior) remains very 
compact in this case. 
On the contrary, when the uncertainties affecting the parameters are not accounted for, the identification of 
the best value of II is more straightforward, since it is usually accepted to consider the mean value of the 
portion of mission time in which the component is faulty or the mean value of the cost as good indicators of 
the performance of the maintenance policy.  
  
Figure 13: Plausibility and Belief distributions of the portion of time horizon in which the component is in a fault state, for 
different values of the control variable II 
 
Figure 14: Plausibility and Belief distributions of the cost associated to the maintenance policy, for different values of the control 
variable II 
5 Conclusions 
Uncertainty affects the parameters of the models of the behavior of components subject to a given 
maintenance policy. An incorrect treatment of such uncertainty may lead to a serious bias in the outcomes of 
the analysis. In particular, such outcomes (e.g., occurrence probability of a failure scenario) may be biased in 
both conservative (e.g., estimated failure probability value larger than the actual one) and non-conservative 
(e.g., estimated failure probability value smaller than the actual one) directions. Often in practice the only 
information available on these parameters comes from experts, in an ambiguous and qualitative form. Most 
commonly, all that is known is that a certain value belongs to a certain interval [36]. The representation of 
the uncertainty of this information in terms of probability distributions would force a set of assumptions, 
with introduction of biases and loss of generality. In this work, a methodology has been proposed based on 
the following steps:  
1) elicitation of the expert knowledge on the model parameters. 
2) Representation of the uncertainty associated to the expert’s judgment, avoiding introduction of 
unjustified, biasing assumptions. In this respect, notice that the choice of any probability distribution 
to represent the uncertainty in the expert’s assignments would be absolutely arbitrary, if the expert is 
not able to assign such additional piece of information. 
3) The propagation of the uncertainty on the maintenance performance indicators. 
The methodology has been applied to a case study concerning the degradation model of a check valve of a 
turbo-pump lubricating system in a Nuclear Power Plant. The study has shown that neglecting uncertainty 
may drive the maintenance decision maker towards incorrect conclusions. In this case, if the unavailability 
computation were performed without taking into account the uncertainty on the input parameters, the 
decision maker would set the inspection intervals between maintenance actions to the value of II=1000h, 
whereas a proper consideration of the uncertainties through the use of FRV suggests that, on the basis of the 
available knowledge, this choice for the maintenance inspection interval is not better than other intervals 
such as II=1500h and II=2000h. 
The main current limitations of the methodology discussed in the present paper are: 
 it is required that a single expert is knowledgeable, at least qualitatively, on all uncertain parameters 
and, what is more, is able to provide intervals of values for the uncertain parameters with associated 
confidence levels: this may be very difficult in practice. However, the FRVs-based method can be 
also applied when the expert provides just one interval of possible values per parameter, thus 
avoiding the problem of the confidence intervals. 
 The results provided are difficult to be interpreted and managed. In this respect, a novel method has 
been proposed by the authors to compare the couples of Belief and Plausibility measures 
corresponding to two different solutions [52]. On this basis, an advanced extension of the Genetic 
Algorithms technique has been concocted to optimize maintenance problems in the presence of 
imprecision [28]. 
 Very large memory demand and computational times are required. Table 6 reports the computational 
times in case of 2000 samples and 8000 combinations of values of the uncertain parameters. 
However, being Matlab an interpretative language, a tool developed in other environments may be 
more performing. This issue will be tackled in future works.  
 Further research effort needs to be spent in order to verify whether the procedure here illustrated can 
be interpreted as a conservative counterpart to the calculus of probabilistic variables under stochastic 
independence, due to the dependence between the choice of confidence levels. 
Parameters Values 
Number of FRVs  2000 
Number of combinations of uncertain parameters  8000 
CPU time (Intel Core 2 duo, 3.17 GHz, 2GB RAM) ≈30h  
Table 6: FRVs-based method parameters 
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Appendix 1: Basics of DSTE and Possibility Theory 
DSTE 
Belief functions can be used to process information which is at the same time of random and imprecise 
nature. The related formal DSTE (also called Theory of Belief Functions) involves the specification of a 
triplet (S, I, m), where S (called ‘sample space’) is the set that contains everything that could occur in the 
universe under consideration, I (referred to as ‘set of focal elements’) is a countable collection of subsets of 


















            
12. 
More intuitively, the DSTE assigns weights (probability masses) to the focal sets; these weights represent the 
amount of likelihood that can be associated to the focal sets but to no proper subset of them (i.e., portions of 
these weights may move freely from one element of the focal set to another) [43]. 
The function m is not the fundamental measure of likelihood of a proposition (set) A; rather, there are two 
measures of likelihood, called Belief and Plausibility, that are obtained from m as [43]:  
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More intuitively, the belief in a proposition (set) A  is quantified as the sum of the probability masses 
assigned to all sets enclosed by it; hence, it is a lower bound representing the amount of belief that directly 
supports the proposition at least in part. The plausibility of event A  is, instead, the sum of the probability 
masses assigned to all sets whose intersection with the proposition is not empty; hence, it is an upper bound 
on the possibility that the proposition could be verified, i.e., it measures the fact that the proposition could 
possibly be true “up to that value” because there is only so much evidence that contradicts it [49]. 
Possibility Theory 
In possibility theory, uncertainty is represented by means of a possibility function ( )Y y , which 
expresses the degree of possibility of each value y of the variable Y  in a set S . When ( ) 0Y y   for some y, 
it means that the outcome y is considered an impossible situation. When ( ) 1Y y   for some y, it means that 
the outcome y is possible, i.e., unsurprising, normal, usual [4]. These values are mutually exclusive, since the 
uncertain variable can take on only one true value. This also gives the normalization condition 
: ( ) 1
Y
y S y   , which is a claim that at least one value is viewed as totally possible, a much weaker 
statement than when probability is 1 [50]. 
A possibility distribution may also be viewed as a nested set of confidence intervals, which are the α–cuts 
[ , ] { | ( ) }
Y
y y y y     of  . The degree of certainty that [ , ]y y   contains Y  is ([ , ] )N y y   ( 1    if Y  
is continuous) [3]. 
The possibility and necessity measures ( )A , ( )N A  for all subsets A S  are defined by the associated 
possibility distribution ( )
Y
y  through the following maximization and minimization relationships, 
respectively: 
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Let P( ) be a family of probability distributions such that for all events A ,   ( ) ( )N A P A A  . Then, 
( ) inf ( )N A P A  and ( ) sup ( )A P A           17. 
where inf and sup are taken with respect to all probability measures in P [3]. Hence, the necessity measure is 
interpreted as a lower level for the probability and the possibility measure is interpreted as an upper limit. 
Referring to subjective probabilities, the bounds reflect that the analyst is not able or willing to precisely 
assign his/her probability, and the bounds are the best he/she can do given the information available; in other 
words, he or she can only describe a subset of P which contains his/her probability. 
 
